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The Social, Environmental and Ethical Performance of 
Chinese Companies: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the social performance of Chinese listed non-financial companies in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. We design a comprehensive social, environment and ethics 
disclosure index (CSPDI) and assess the bi-directional relationship between corporate social 
performance and financial performance using the three-stage least squares (3SLS). We find 
that the mean value of CSPDI is 53% and high social disclosure is associated more with 
environmentally sensitive industries. Moreover, the index results show that little attention has 
been paid to ethical issues. Interestingly, we find that the better the financial performance, the 
worse the corporate social performance disclosure. This result is consistent with the 
managerial opportunism hypothesis. Finally, the results of the 3SLS estimation show that the 
causality between the two endogenous variables runs from financial performance to the 
corporate social performance. This suggests that the corporate social performance is 
determined by financial performance. 
 
Key words: Corporate social responsibility, ethics, social performance and financial performance, 
Chinese companies 
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The Social, Environmental and Ethical Performance of 
Chinese Companies: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange 
 
1. Introduction 
Ethical behaviour of organisations has become a cornerstone of corporate survival, 
sustainability and growth. Business ethics has attracted the attention of researchers, mass 
media and business press after a sequence of corporate scandals including, Enron and 
Worldcom, in addition to the Sanlu Group scandal and Zijin Mining Group pollution accident
 
 
in China in 2008 and 2010 respectively
1
. Therefore, stakeholders impose more pressure on 
business organisations to disclose their corporate values, social responsibility, ethical 
behaviour and their overall corporate social performance 
2
 (CSP) (Waddock and Graves, 
1997; Ponemon and Michaelson, 2000; Stevens et al., 2005 and Berrone et al., 2007).  
 
China has different socio-economic and cultural frameworks compared with western 
countries; moreover it has an increasing importance in the world economy in terms of 
economic growth (9.2% and 8% in 2011 and 2012 respectively). Over the past few years 
there has been an increasing importance placed on social disclosure in China. In 2008 the 
Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection and the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) launched the so called “Green Securities” policy. The latter imposes 
additional constraints (environmental assessment) on high- polluting industries to access 
capital markets
3
. Moreover, in 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued a notice to 
encourage listed companies to disclose and publish corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
reports along with their annual financial reports on the Shanghai Stock Exchange website.  
 
Therefore studying the Chinese experience is timely, unique and adds to the existing 
literature on CSP. There are a few studies on Chinese CSP, see for instance Gao (2009), Zu 
                                                          
1
 Sanlu Group Company added melamine into the formula milk powder to increase the protein content, however 
it could lead to the development of kidney stones in infants. Zijing Mining Group pollution accident involved a 
leakage of 9100 cubic meters of acid into a river. This resulted in a serious pollution incident. 
2
 Waddock and Graves (1997) describe CSP as “A multidimensional construct, with behaviours ranging across 
a wide variety of inputs (e.g., investments in pollution control equipment or other environmental strategies), 
internal behaviours or processes (e.g., treatment of women and minorities, nature of products produced, 
relationships with customers) and outputs (e.g., community relation and philanthropic programmes)”. 
3
 The approval of the Ministry of Environmental Protection is also required pre IPOs.  
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and Song (2009), Li and Zhang (2010) and more recently, Ye and Zhang (2011), and Liu et 
al., (2012). However, they largely ignore ethics and environment protection dimensions and 
their impact on financial performance (FP) in China
4
. This paper has three main objectives; 
first, we attempt to identify and assess the degree of variation in the revealed social, ethical 
and environmental activities disclosed in the annual reports and the websites of a sample of 
Chinese non-financial companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2011. To 
achieve this objective, we design a comprehensive CSP disclosure index for listed companies 
in the SSE 180 Index. Secondly, we investigate the main determinants of CSP and finally, we 
investigate the potential bi-directional relationship between CSP measured by CSPDI and FP.  
 
Our results show that Chinese companies are most interested in shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. However, little attention has been paid to ethical issues. Our results are 
consistent with Gao (2009) as there are some limitations regarding social, ethical and 
environmental disclosure in China. We also find that the better the company’s FP, the worse 
its CSP. Our results are consistent with the managerial opportunism hypothesis of Preston 
and O’Bannon (1997). Finally, the results of the 3SLS estimation show that the causality 
between the two endogenous variables runs from FP to CSP. This suggests that the social, 
ethical and environmental disclosure of the Chinese listed companies is determined by their 
FP.  
 
The main contributions of this paper are threefold; first, this is the first study to design a 
comprehensive corporate social performance disclosure index that takes into account the 
Shanghai CSR Notice and the China Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting Guidelines 
issued by the Corporate Social Responsibility Research Center at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science released in 2009. Moreover, our paper - to the best of our knowledge – is the 
first to investigate the broader definition of CSP including governance, ethics, environmental 
protection, energy saving and pollution control, and community involvement dimensions and 
their impact on the FP of Chinese companies. Finally, our paper is the first to investigate the 
bi-directional relationship between CSP and FP in the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
 
                                                          
4
 Over the past 5 years, China was ranked the first country in the world in carbon dioxide emission; China alone 
is responsible for 80% of the growth in global carbon emission in 2011 (9.7 billion metric tons or 28% of the 
world carbon dioxide emission in 2011). For more details see, United Nations: Framework Convention on 
Climate Change; http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php   
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the literature review 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the dataset used in the analysis. Sections 4 
and 5 present the methodology and the empirical results respectively. Finally, section 6 
summarises and concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Previous research on the development of social disclosure in China 
There are a few studies that have investigated the development of social disclosure and the 
overall social performance in China. Gao (2009) analyses the developments in the Chinese 
CSR of large companies in 2007. He shows that although China has  an institutional 
background to develop CSR, many political, social and economic constraints are imposed 
and, as a result, CSR is in its early stage of development and CSR-related activities vary 
amongst different industries for large companies. By contrast, Cheung et al. (2012) find 
remarkable progress in social activities and practices in Chinese companies, as they find a 
substantial increase in the CSR disclosure over the period 2006-2007 and thus the stock 
market rewards those companies for improving their corporate governance and social 
performance. Zu and Song (2009) investigate how the Chinese top executives perceive and 
interpret CSR and how company’s characteristics influence the attitude of managers towards 
their involvement in social activities. They find a high percentage of managers showing their 
willingness to engage more in social activities; however the nature of their association is 
linked to entrepreneurs’ instincts of gaining economic benefits.  
 
Li and Zhang (2010) investigate the relationship between ownership structure and social 
activities; they find that CSR in state-owned companies is negatively associated with the 
ownership structure due to the political interference in more developed areas in China. 
Marquis and Qian (2013) find that Chinese listed companies face a decoupling risk which 
leads to a high likelihood to enact substantive CSR actions in situations in which they are 
likely to be monitored. Ye and Zhang (2011) find a U shaped relationship between CSR and 
cost of debt finance. Therefore, enhancements in CSR reduce the cost of debt finance when 
investment in CSR is lower than its optimal level and the opposite is the case if CSR 
investment exceeds its optimal level.  
Whilst a few studies have investigated the development of CSR in China, no other studies - to 
the best of our knowledge - have investigated the ethical, environmental and social 
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performance of Chinese companies and the bi-directional relationship with FP in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange; we are trying to fill this gap in the literature with this paper.  
 
 
2.2 Corporate social and financial performance nexus 
The existing body of the literature on social disclosure introduces three fundamental theories 
namely, agency theory, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. Cormier et al. (2005) argue 
that as the main focus of agency theory is on wealth maximisation, there might be therefore 
some limitations regarding social, ethical and environmental disclosure. Legitimacy theory on 
the other hand, assumes that decisions made by a company should be consistent with its 
social norms, values and beliefs (Perrow, 1970). Failure to do so may threaten the company’s 
legitimacy, resources, and, ultimately, its survival (Reverte, 2009). According to stakeholder 
theory, one way to satisfy stakeholders’ demands is to adopt a policy of cost reduction and to 
increase investments in social activities (Freeman, 1984). Therefore, managers may disclose 
voluntary information as a signal to the powerful stakeholders to gain their support (Freeman, 
1984). 
 
The relationship between CSP and FP has been investigated in the literature. However, there 
is a controversy in the results due to the discrepancies in theoretical and methodological 
frameworks. The proponents of the positive CSP-FP relationship argue that the benefits from 
CSP are greater in comparison with its costs; see for instance Orlitzky (2001) and Waddock 
and Graves (1997)
5
. Neoclassical economists are the proponent of the negative association 
between CSP and FP (Simpson and Kohers, 2002). They argue that spending on social 
activities (e.g. investment in pollution control equipment) might be avoided or should be 
borne by governments or other stakeholders (Preston and O’Bannon, 1997). Finally, the 
neutral (non-existent) relationship argues that there are many other intervening variables; 
therefore there might not be a direct relationship between CSP and FP (Ullman, 1985). 
 
There are a few studies on social activities and the link with financial performance in Chinese 
companies. However, no other studies have investigated the broader definition of CSP 
measured by governance, ethics, environmental protection, energy saving and pollution 
                                                          
5
 Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that there might be a conflict between explicit costs (payments to 
bondholders) and implicit costs (environment protection), however, if companies intend to minimise their 
implicit costs by socially irresponsible actions, this may result in higher explicit costs. They claim that the 
benefits from CSP are greater in comparison with its costs; for instance enlightened employee relations policy 
may have a (lower) cost but may lead to higher productivity. 
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control, and community involvement dimensions and their impact on FP of Chinese 
companies. Zu and Song (2009) find a positive relationship between FP and the degree of 
involvement in social activities, but they did not show the direction of this causality. Chen 
and Wang (2011) also find that social disclosure can improve FP of Chinese companies. Su 
and He (2010) find a positive and significant relationship between philanthropy and 
charitable activities as a proxy for social performance and FP for private equity companies in 
China. They argue that private enterprises carried out philanthropy and charitable activities to 
better protect property rights and to strengthen the political connections which in turn lead to 
better FP. Wang and Qian (2011) find consistent results with Su and He (2010) as they argue 
that corporate philanthropy is positively related to FP because it helps companies gain socio-
political legitimacy. Based on the above discussion, we formulate our first hypothesis as 
follows:  
 
H1: There is a positive relationship between ethical, environmental and social performance 
of Chinese companies and their financial performance. 
 
2.3 Bi-directional relationship between CSP and FP 
There have been alternative interpretations of the direction of causality between CSP and FP. 
The “slack resources theory” assumes that available slack resources might be allocated into 
the social domain. This implies more opportunities for companies to engage in social 
activities and thus better CSP. By contrast, Preston and O’Bannon (1997) promote “the 
managerial opportunism hypothesis”, in which managers try to increase their benefits by 
reducing the expenditures on social activities. However, managers may also justify their poor 
performance by engaging in noticeable social activities. Under the “slack resources theory” 
and “managerial opportunism hypothesis”, the CSP- FP relationship runs from FP to CSP. 
This suggests that CSP is determined by FP (Waddock and Graves, 1997).  
 
 
On the other hand, “good management theory” suggests that prior CSP is directly associated 
with subsequent FP simply because addressing CSP domains like environmental awareness, 
good employee and community relations may result in better FP
6
 (Freeman, 1984 and 
McGuire et al., 1988). Similarly, the “social impact hypothesis” of Cornell and Shapiro 
                                                          
6
 For instance, good relationships among employees (including women and ethnic minorities) may lead to 
improvements in morale, productivity, and satisfaction and this has implications for FP. Moreover, good 
relationships may motivate local government to provide better tax regimes, improved education and health 
programmes and reduce regulations (Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
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(1987) suggests that satisfying the different needs of stakeholders will improve the reputation 
of the company and lead to better FP
7
. Under the “good management theory,” and social 
impact hypothesis, CSP would be a predictor of FP.  
 
The existing literature on Chinese companies has investigated the influence of CSR on FP 
and found that companies involved in social and philanthropic activities have  better FP; see 
for instance, Zu and Song (2009)  Chen and Wang (2011), Su and He (2010) Wang and Qian 
(2011). However, there are no other studies – to the best of our knowledge – that analyse and 
interpret the potential bi-directional causality between social performance and FP in China. 
Our paper tries to fill this gap in the literature; hence we formulate our second hypothesis as 
follows: 
H2: The relationship between corporate social performance and financial performance in 
Chinese listed companies is bi-directional. 
 
3. Dataset and Variables Description 
Our data is set up for a cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between the CSP and FP of 
the constituents of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 180 Index in 2011
8
. The SSE 180 
index reflects the performance of top companies listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The 
constituents of this index are selected based on an overall rank of total market capitalisation, 
negotiable market capitalisation, trading values and turnover ratio across different industry 
sectors. We exclude financial companies as they are subject to a different regulatory 
framework. Therefore, our final sample includes 149 non-financial companies.  
 
Our data is hand-collected from annual reports, social responsibility (sustainability) reports, 
financial statements and the websites of the respective companies. We also collected market 
information over the period 2009-2011 from the Thomson One Banker database and the 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which is designed and 
developed by GTA Information Technology Corporation.  
 
 
We measure CSP by using the CSPDI disclosure index (more details are provided about the 
index design methodology in Section 4). We also use both market-based and accounting-
                                                          
7
 The “trade-off hypothesis” of Vance (1975) indicates that the cost of the social programmes exceeds their 
potential benefits and that spending on such activities results in poor FP. 
8
 We use cross–section regression rather than panel data as we could not find annual variation in the CSPDI 
across time in particular in 2009, 2010 and 2011.   
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based ratios to measure companies’ FP, namely Tobin’s Q, annualized daily stock returns and 
return on assets. We argue that using a one year (contemporaneous or lagged) FP measure 
might not be the optimal choice, because it may lay the estimation open to performance bias 
in a particular year. Therefore, we use average Tobin’s Q, annualized daily stock returns and 
ROA over the period 2009-2011 as a measure of FP. Moreover, we use contemporaneous and 
lagged FP measures as a robustness check.  
 
 
We construct a number of firm-specific variables which are the primary determinants of CSP. 
A large strand of the literature on CSR finds an association between company size and CSR 
disclosure (see for example, Mallin and Michelon, 2011, Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2003 and 
Brammer et al., 2006). The larger the company, the more likely it is to engage in social 
activities as larger companies are subject to more social and political pressure than small 
companies, (Reverte, 2009). As companies evolve over their life cycle, their stakeholders 
expect much more involvement in ethical and social activities. Deviations from this expected 
social profile could have a negative impact on the stakeholders’ perceptions (Roberts, 1992). 
We use companies total market capitalisation as a proxy for size.  
 
One of the distinguishing features of the Chinese governance mechanism is the dominance of 
state ownership and control (Kato and Long, 2006). Wang et al. (2008) find a positive 
association between the level of disclosure and the proportion of state ownership. They argue 
that state-owned companies may disclose additional information to mitigate the severe 
information asymmetry and agency problems. 
However the literature provides mixed evidence on the influence of state ownership on 
disclosure. Xiao et al. (2004) find that the higher the state ownership the less online 
disclosure. Li and Zhang (2010) find consistent results with Xiao et al. (2004) as they find 
that CSR in state-owned companies is negatively associated with the ownership structure due 
to the political interference in more developed areas in China. Therefore, we incorporate a 
state-owned (SO) dummy variable to control for the government ownership structure. We 
also use the proportion of state ownership as a robustness check.  
The literature also offers inconclusive results on the relationship between company age and 
social disclosure. Roberts (1992) argues that the older the company the more involvement 
there will be in social activities which have a positive impact on its reputation accordingly. 
However Jaggi (1997) and Chen, and Firth (1999) find a negative relationship between 
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company age and the extent of its disclosure. Therefore we may expect either a positive or a 
negative relationship between company age and its CSP disclosure. We also create a cross-
listing (CL) dummy variable as cross-listed companies might be subject to more regulations 
and thus required to disclose their social activities in their annual reports.  
 
A high leverage ratio may encourage companies to disclose more voluntarily in order to 
mitigate the information asymmetry problem between the company and its creditors. Barako 
et al (2006) find a positive link between the leverage ratio and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Therefore, we also take into account the impact of financial risk by controlling for 
the ratio of total debt to total equity as a proxy for financial leverage.
9
 Finally, we create a set 
of industry dummies - based on the industry classification in SSE - to control for the potential 
inter-industry differences in social disclosure. Table 1 presents a description of the main 
variables used in the analysis. 
Insert Table 1 here 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Corporate social performance disclosure index (CSPDI) Design  
In May 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange issued the “CSR Notice” and the Guidelines on 
Listed Companies' Environmental Information Disclosure. Accordingly, listed companies are 
required to issue CSR reports along with their annual reports to address the interests of 
stakeholders. Moreover, according to the CSR Notice, companies should commit themselves 
to promoting sustainable economic and social development
10
. The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
also encourages listed companies to improve and develop a strategy for CSR disclosure. 
Therefore, listed companies are encouraged to disseminate CSR information on their websites 
in addition to their annual reports and CSR reports.
11
 
 
Furthermore, the Corporate Social Responsibility Research Center at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science released the China Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting Guidelines 
(CASS-CSR 1.0) in 2009. The conceptual framework of the guidelines is based on 
Elkington’s (1997) triple bottom line theory and Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder approach.12 
                                                          
9
 Given the potential endogeneity in determining a firm’s CSPDI disclosure, we used lagged company size and 
leverage.  
10
 For more details see  http://www.world-exchanges.org/sustainability/m-6-7-1.php 
11
 Chinese listed companies are encouraged to disclose information on environmental protection policies; energy 
saving; environmental development and investment; environmental protection and waste recycling. 
12
 Elkington’s (1997) triple bottom line refers to a situation where companies harmonize their efforts in order to 
be economically viable, environmentally sound and socially responsible. Freeman (1984) indicates that 
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We design a comprehensive disclosure index to measure social, ethical and environmental 
performance of Chinese companies. The philosophy of the index construction is mainly based 
on the guidelines issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2008 and the guidelines issued 
by CASS in 2009.  
 
 
We augment this index by adding extra two dimensions namely ethics and governance. The 
ethics dimension is designed in the light of the study of Gao (2009). We also revised the other 
items/dimensions of the index following Waddock and Graves (1997) and Gao (2009) to 
reflect the broader definition of CSP including mandatory and voluntary disclosures. We 
refer to a similar strand of literature to construct our index including Gao (2009), Haniffa and 
Cook (2002, 2005), Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Mallin and Ow-Yong, (2012). Our index 
consists of 10 dimensions namely ethics; corporate governance; corporate social 
responsibility management; government; employees; community involvement; environment 
protection, energy saving and pollution control; customers; investors and finally, partners. 
Each dimension consists of several items. The total number of items is 97 as in Appendix 1. 
We deal with each item as a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the item is found 
in the annual reports/websites and zero otherwise. Our index is equally weighted - as in 
Equation 1- to avoid any potential scoring and scaling biases
13
. 
         
i
n
n
i
i
n
X
CSPDI

 1                                                                                    (1)                                                  
Where: iCSPDI  
: Corporate social performance disclosure index for company (i), 
                                10  iCSPDI  
 in       : Number of items disclosed by company (i) 97n   
iX      : Dummy variables take the value of 1 if the item is disclosed and 0 
              otherwise. 
We took precautionary measures to enhance the validity and the reliability of our analysis. To 
enhance the reliability, the index items are coded and checked twice and we discussed any 
potential discrepancies. To improve the index reliability, we carefully chose and developed 
the 10 dimensions of our CSPDI to suit the context of the Chinese environment
14
. It is worth 
mentioning that each company is coded by two different coders to ensure consistency. We 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
organizations are not only accountable to their shareholders but should also balance a multiplicity of 
stakeholders’ interests that can affect, or are affected by, the achievement of an organisation’s objectives. 
13
 See for instance, GOV-Score 51 of Brown and Caylor (2006), G-index of Gompers et al. (2003), GOV41 of 
Aggarwal et al. (2011), GOV52 of Gupta et al. (2013), Mallin and Ow-Yong, (2012) and Farag et al. (2014).   
14
 We also use Asset4 database – where data is available on SSE- to double check the items for CSPDI.  
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make sure that the same coder is consistent over time when coding the same item of the index 
(stability), that the coders produce the same results when coding the same item 
(reproducibility) and accuracy as well (Beattie et al. 2004).  
 
4.2 CSPDI & FP nexus in China 
In this section we investigate the CSP-FP link for the constituents of the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) 180 Index, we use the following cross sectional regression as in Equation 2: 
iiiiiiii FLSOCLSZAGEFPCSPDI   6543210           (2) 
where, CSPDI is the corporate social performance  disclosure index; FP is financial 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q, annualized daily stock returns and ROA; AGE and SZ 
are company age and size, respectively; CL and SO are dummies for cross-listed and state-
owned companies, respectively; FL is financial leverage; and i  is the error term. Moreover, 
we investigate the potential reverse causality and the influence of CSPDI on FP. We use the 
following cross sectional regression as in Equation 3. 
 
 iiiiiiii FLSOCLSZAGECSPIFP   6543210       (3) 
Finally, we estimate both equations 2 and 3 using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimators. We use the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator to control for heteroskedasticity 
which may be present in the firm-level data and to produce robust standard errors.  
 
4.2 Bi-directional relationship between CSPDI and FP 
 
In this section, we investigate the direction of causality between CSP and FP. As both CSP 
and FP can be considered as endogenous variables, the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation of equations 2 and 3 might be subject to a potential reverse causality between the 
two endogenous variables. To address this endogeneity problem and to investigate the bi-
directional relationship between CSP and FP, we use the three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
following Farag et al. (2014).
15
 Although the 3SLS method is asymptotically more efficient, 
it is also more vulnerable to specification errors as compared to 2SLS. Therefore, we also 
estimate the 2SLS as a robustness check. We formulate the following system of simultaneous 
                                                          
15
 The main advantage of the 3SLS estimation technique is that it allows, not only for simultaneity among the 
corporate social performance and financial performance, but also for correlations among the error components. 
Thus, it is believed that 3SLS estimators are asymptotically more efficient than two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimators.  
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equations. The simultaneous equations system explicitly allows for the interactions between 
CSPDI-as a proxy for CSP- and FP.
16
  
        
)4(),,(
)4(),,(
221
111
bZCSPDIfFP
aZFPfCSPDI
iiii
iiii




 
 
Where, CSPDI is the corporate social performance  disclosure index; FP is financial 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q, annualized daily stock returns and ROA in 2011; iZ are 
the vector of control variables and instruments influencing the dependent variables; and i are 
the white noise error terms associated with the unobservable effects resulting from firm 
heterogeneity i.e. unobservable features of managerial behaviour that explain heterogeneity in 
the two endogenous variables (CSPDI and FP). Since the simultaneous equations system 
explicitly allows for the endogeneity of the dependent variables, we use contemporaneous 
CSPDI and FP.  
 
All dependent variables are explicitly taken to be endogenous to the system and are treated as 
correlated with the disturbances in the system’s equations. All other variables in the system 
are treated as exogenous to the system and uncorrelated with the disturbances. The exogenous 
variables are taken to be instruments for the endogenous variables
17
.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Analysis of the CSPDI scores 
Table 2 (Panel A) presents the descriptive statistics for the CSPDI by its dimensions. The 
mean value of CSPDI is 53% with a standard deviation of 19%. Among the 149 non-financial 
firms in our sample, the best performing company has a CSPDI score of 93%, while the worst 
performing one only achieves 25%. The ethics dimension (D1) has the lowest mean value of 
32%, indicating that little attention has been paid to ethical issues. This result is consistent 
with Gao (2009) as he finds that CSP in China is in its early stage and largely differs across 
industrial companies. However, Chinese listed companies pay great attention to their 
responsibility to the investors as suggested by the mean value of 89%.   
                                                          
16
 The equations specified in the system have to be identified. Thus, we re-specify the financial performance 
equation by removing firm age and including a lagged FP variable instead, so that both equations become 
identified. 
17
 Corporate governance characteristics may have an influence on CSR and can be used as alternative 
instruments. However, they are likely to be correlated with FP measures (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). More 
importantly, corporate governance characteristics are included in our CSPDI (dimension 2). We also use -
following Ye and Zhang (2011) - R&D intensity (the ratio of intangible assets to total assets) as alternative 
instruments for CSP and obtained similar results.  
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Meanwhile, Table 2 (Panel B) presents the descriptive statistics for the CSPDI by industry. 
Among the seven major industries, real estate has the lowest CSPDI score (45%).   However, 
Chinese listed companies in the construction industry have the highest CSPDI score of 71%. 
Transportation and mining industries also have relatively high scores of CSPDI, with the 
mean values of 60% and 59% respectively. This result is consistent with Reverte (2009) who 
found that environmentally sensitive industries have better social disclosure.  
 
 
As state ownership is a prevalent feature for the Chinese companies, we present in Panel C of 
Table 2 the CSPDI scores for both State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non- SOEs. The 
results show that the average CSPDI scores for SOEs and non-SOEs are 56% and 45% 
respectively. Although there is no significant difference between the CSPDI scores for SOEs 
and non-SOEs, this result suggests that SOEs may have a stronger sense of CSP disclosure 
compared with non-SOEs. We argue that state-owned companies may encourage investment 
in CSP and hence benefit from social activities e.g. excess employment and employees’ 
social welfare compared with non-state-owned companies. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 3 presents the CSPDI items with the lowest scores across the 10 dimensions and across 
industries. The ethics dimension has the lowest CSPDI score of 32%. Moreover a closer 
analysis of the ethics dimension in Table 3 shows that the items of “issue guideline for 
business ethics” and “issue guideline for employees’ behaviour” have the lowest CSPDI 
scores of 8% and 10% respectively.   
 
 
The corporate governance dimension (D2) has been well disclosed by Chinese listed 
companies. It has a relatively high CSPDI score of 76% (see Table 2 Panel A). However, 
Table 3 shows that, surprisingly, listed companies in the SSE should disclose more 
information on board composition and committee membership as the index scores of 
“membership of committees” and “board composition: executive vs. non-executive” items 
have the lowest CSPDI scores of 12% and 16% respectively. On the social responsibility 
dimension (D3), Chinese listed companies in our sample have paid less attention to CSR 
training and the management mechanism for CSR. Their CSPDI scores are 12% and 19% 
respectively. Table 2 (Panel A) reports a relatively low CSPDI score (40%) of the “corporate 
social responsibility management” dimension. 
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On the other hand, Chinese listed companies in our sample disclose a reasonable amount of 
information on the “Government” dimension (D4) as its CSPDI score is 59%. Our results 
also show that the overall CSPDI score for the “Employee” dimension (D5) is 53% and the 
proportion of companies that discloses information on “encouraging disabled employees” and 
the “amount spent on employees training” are 9% and 10% respectively. Moreover, we find 
that community involvement (D6) and environment protection, energy saving and pollution 
control dimensions (D7) have relatively low index scores of 39% and 40% respectively. For 
instance, Table 3 reports that the proportion of companies that discloses on “the nature of 
charitable and social activities financed” is 7%. However, the proportions of companies that 
disclose on “information on green office policy” and “the amount spent on environment 
protection” are 15% and 19% respectively. 
 
 
Chinese companies disclose a reasonable amount of information on the “Customer” 
dimension (D8) as the mean value of its CSPDI score is 50%. However, more disclosure 
seems to be required on “customer private information protection” as the proportion of 
companies that discloses on this item is 8%.  By contrast, the investor dimension (D9) has the 
highest mean value (89%). This suggests that Chinese listed companies pay greater attention 
to their responsibility to investors and that they mainly focus on shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. Table 3 also reports the items with the lowest CSPDI scores across industries. 
The results presented in Table 3 show that the worst performing industries are manufacturing 
and real estate. However, the best performing companies are in construction sector. Figures 1 
and 2 present the mean values of CSPDI by dimensions and by industries respectively.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here 
 
 
 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the empirical 
analysis. The mean values of Tobin’s Q and ROA are 1.64 and 0.07 respectively, whereas the 
mean value of the annualised daily stock returns is 36%.  The average company age is 13.32 
years with a range between 3 to 28 years. The average market capitalisation at the end of 
2011 is RMB 46,844 million. Table 4 also shows that 16% of the sample firms are cross-
listed, and 73% of them are effectively controlled by the government and its agencies with 
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average state- ownership equal to 13%. Finally, the mean dividends payout and leverage 
ratios are 0.27 and 1.60 respectively. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables used in the analysis.  It is clear 
from Table 5 that there is no evidence of multicollinearity problems
18
. CSPDI is negatively 
and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q, annualised daily stock returns, ROA and 
company age, whereas it is positively and significantly correlated with company size, cross-
listing and state-ownership.  
Insert Table 5 here 
 
5.3 CSPDI-FP nexus 
The OLS estimation results for equations 2 and 3 are summarised in Table 6. Panel A reports 
the estimation results for the CSPDI equation. The three alternative measures of FP, namely 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, and stock returns are used in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively19. Looking first 
at model 1, it shows that the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting that the better the company’s FP, the worse its corporate social, 
environmental and ethical disclosure. Our results are consistent with the managerial 
opportunism hypothesis of Preston and O’Bannon (1997) in which managers are keen to 
increase shareholders’ wealth and their benefits by reducing the expenditure on social 
activities. This result also suggests that Chinese managers are working in the best interest of 
their shareholders. This implies that there are some limitations regarding social, ethical and 
environmental disclosure in China.  
 
Both company size and the cross-listing dummy have a positive and significant impact on 
CSPDI. This suggests that large companies engage more in social, environmental and ethical 
activities; meanwhile cross-listed companies are likely to be subject to stricter regulations to 
disclose their social, environmental and ethical activities in their annual reports. Moreover, 
Table 6 shows that the coefficient of company age is marginally significant with a negative 
sign. This suggests that older companies may engage more in social activities but in a more 
covert way, i.e. they do not disclose these activities. In addition, a well-established company 
                                                          
18
 We also use the variance inflation factors (VIF) to examine whether the independent variables are perfectly 
collinear and found that the VIF value (2.3) is well below 10; this suggests that our model is not subject to 
multicollinearity problems. 
19
 We also use one year contemporaneous and lagged FP measures in equation 2 and obtained similar results. 
Results are not presented here but are available from the authors upon request. 
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may have a slightly different set of stakeholders compared to newer companies
20
. The latter’s 
stakeholders may demand that it engages in, and discloses, its social activities more so than 
the stakeholders of the established companies. The state-owned dummy and financial 
leverage are insignificant in the CSPDI equation.  
 
Similar results are found in models 2 and 3 in which ROA and stock returns are used. 
However, the ROA and Stock returns coefficients turn out to be less significant at the 
conventional level of 5% and 10% respectively. We also include industry dummies in 
alternative estimations of equations 2 and 3.  We find that industry dummies are jointly 
insignificant so that we do not present them in Table 6. We present this result in the 
robustness tests section. The models are well specified as the R
2
s are 0.45, 0.38 and 0.37 for 
models 1, 2 and 3 respectively and the F statistics are highly significant for the three models.  
 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the estimation results for the FP equation, in which Tobin’s Q, 
ROA and stock returns are used as dependent variables in their respective regressions. The 
coefficients for CSPDI are found to be negative and statistically significant in models 4 - 6. 
This result is consistent with the neoclassical economists’ view and the trade-off hypothesis 
(see Simpson and Kohers, 2002). They argue that CSP implies more spending on social 
activities and thus shareholders’ wealth reduction. These costs (i.e. investment in pollution 
control equipment) might be avoided or should be borne by governments or other 
stakeholders (Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997). Therefore the costs 
of the social activities exceed their potential benefits and result in shareholder wealth 
reduction (Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
In addition, we find a negative and significant relationship between financial leverage and 
financial performance. Moreover, larger companies tend to be more profitable. The three 
models presented in Panel B are statistically significant with R
2
 of 0.24, 0.23 and 0.20 
respectively. Overall, the OLS estimation results presented in Table 6 show that CSP and FP 
are negatively associated. Therefore we find evidence to reject our first hypothesis. However, 
we investigate the direction of causality in the following section. 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Since SZ and CL are significantly correlated, we re-estimate the equations by dropping either SZ or CL. Our 
empirical results remain unchanged. 
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5.3 Bi-directional relationship between CSPDI and FP 
 
 To this end, we estimate equations 4 (a) and (b) simultaneously using 3SLS estimations to 
address the potential endogeneity between CSP and FP. The 3SLS estimation results for the 
simultaneous equations systems are summarised in Table 7. 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
The results of system 1, in which Tobin’s Q is employed, are reported in columns 1 and 4 of 
Table 7. The coefficient on Tobin’s Q in the CSPDI equation remains negative and 
significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient on CSPDI in the FP equation turns out to 
be statistically insignificant. This suggests that the causality between the two endogenous 
variables runs from FP to CSP. Moreover, company age becomes significantly negative in the 
CSPDI equation; however both company size and cross-listing variables remain highly 
significant. The lagged Tobin’s Q is also highly significant in the FP equation, providing 
empirical evidence of the dynamic structure of profitability. 
 
The results for systems 2 and 3 presented in Table 7 show that using both ROA and Stock 
return instead of Tobin’s Q as FP measures does not alter our findings21. Overall, the 
simultaneous equations systems are jointly significant at the 1% level.
22
 The 3SLS results 
strongly suggest that the CSP disclosure index of Chinese listed companies is determined by 
their financial performance and the opposite is not true. Therefore we can reject our second 
hypothesis.  
 
 
5.4 Robustness Tests 
 
In this section we present a set of robustness tests. Table 8 reports the results of the cross-
sectional regressions of Equation 2 using the ordinary least squares (OLS). In model 1, we 
control for industry fixed effects, whereas in model 2, we use the lagged Tobin’s Q ratio in 
2010. In models 3 and 4, we control for the dividends pay-out ratio and the proportion of 
state ownership respectively. The results presented in Table 8 are consistent with those 
presented in Table 6 (Panel A). We find a negative and highly significant relationship 
between CSPDI and FP. We also find consistent results with regard to the influence of 
company size, age and the cross-listing on CSPDI. The results also show that there is no 
                                                          
21
 Note that ROA is still marginally significant in the CSPDI equation 
22
 We use the 2SLS estimation as a robustness check. The 2SLS estimation results are quite similar to those 
obtained from 3SLS. Results are not presented but are available from the authors upon request. 
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significant relationship between both the dividends payout ratio and the proportion of state 
ownership and the CSPDI.   
To address the concern that our results may simply be driven by the impact of a particular 
dimension e.g. ethics and governance, we re-estimate equation 2 using the CSP index 
suggested by the Chinese Academy of Social Science and find similar results to those 
presented in Table 6.
23
  
 
6. Summary and conclusion  
The main objective of this paper is to design a comprehensive CSP disclosure index for a 
sample of Chinese listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange to identify and assess 
the degree of variation in the revealed social, ethical and environmental activities. Moreover, 
we investigate the main determinants of CSP and the potential bi-directional relationship 
between CSP and FP. We design our index to capture the Chinese CSP based on the 
recommendations of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the guidelines issued by the Corporate 
Social Responsibility Research Centre at the Chinese Academy of Social Science. We 
include two extra dimensions to capture ethics and corporate governance. We also revise the 
other items/dimensions of the index following Waddock and Graves (1997) and Gao (2009) 
to reflect the broader definition of CSP. 
 
Our results show that Chinese companies are most interested in shareholders’ wealth 
maximisation. The mean value of CSPDI is 53% and the ethical dimension has the lowest 
mean value of 32%, indicating that little attention has been paid to ethical issues. Community 
involvement and environment protection, energy saving and pollution control dimensions 
also have relatively low index scores of 39% and 40% respectively. This result is consistent 
with Gao (2009); he argues that CSP in China is in its early stage and largely differs across 
industrial companies. By contrast, Chinese listed companies pay great attention to their 
responsibility to investors as the mean value of the investors’ dimension is 89%. Construction, 
transportation and mining industries have relatively high scores of CSPDI. This result is 
consistent with Reverte (2009) as high social disclosure is associated with more 
environmentally sensitive industries.  
 
We also find that the better the company’s FP, the worse its CSP. Our results are consistent 
with the managerial opportunism hypothesis of Preston and O’Bannon (1997) in which 
                                                          
23
 The results are not presented but available from the authors upon request. 
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managers are keen to increase shareholders’ wealth and their benefits by reducing the 
expenditures on social activities. This result is also consistent with agency theory and 
suggests that Chinese managers are working in the best interests of their shareholders. This 
implies that there are some limitations regarding social, ethical and environmental disclosure 
in China. Finally, the results of the 3SLS show that the causality between the two endogenous 
variables runs from FP to CSP. This suggests that the social, ethical and environmental 
disclosure index of the Chinese listed companies is determined by their FP.  
 
Our findings have a number of policy implications. Firstly, as the results show that Chinese 
companies have relatively low ethics and environment disclosure index scores, we might 
expect Chinese companies to be setting higher ethical and environmental standards in future, 
given recent scandals e.g. the milk scandal of Sanlu Group Company and the Zijing Mining 
Group pollution accident. The latter is particularly important as China was ranked the first 
country in the world in carbon dioxide emissions (i.e. it produces the highest level of carbon 
dioxide emissions). Therefore, policy-makers and regulators may introduce incentive 
schemes (including tax incentives) to encourage Chinese companies to engage more in 
ethical, social and environmental activities.  We also argue that policy-makers may consider 
forcing environmentally sensitive companies to issue a separate report on their environmental 
impact and how they control the sources, and impacts, of pollution. Finally, we argue that 
policy-makers may promote the role of investors and other stakeholders with regard to the 
importance and the quality of corporate social disclosure by encouraging more sustainable 
and socially responsible investments.  
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Appendix 1: Corporate Social Performance Disclosure Index (CSPDI) 
Dimension I: Ethics 
1. Ethics policy 
2. Respect social culture 
3. Respect commercial culture 
4. Issue guideline for employees’ behaviour 
5. Issue guideline for business ethics 
6. Advocate self-discipline 
7. Volunteer policy 
8. Anti-corruption and/or anti-commercial bribery policies 
9. Law and regulation compliance 
10. Equal opportunities policy 
11. Promoting fair competition 
Dimension II: Corporate Governance 
1. Vision and mission statement 
2. Profile and current position of board members 
3. Number of board of directors 
4. Number of board meetings 
5. Membership of committees 
6. Board composition: executive vs. non-executive  
7. Board composition: independent vs. non-independent  
8. Role duality: CEO is Chairman of board 
9. Picture of board members 
10. Shareholding of board members 
11. Multiple-directorships exist among board members 
12. Directors’ fees and remuneration 
13. Corporate organizational structure 
Dimension III: Corporate Social Responsibility Management 
1. Main concepts and/or roles of social responsibility 
2. Strategy of corporate social responsibility  
3. Management mechanism of corporate social responsibility  
4. Promoting the concept of corporate social responsibility  
5. Communication of corporate social responsibility with related parties 
6. Training on corporate social responsibility 
Dimension IV: Government 
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1. Identification of government’s interest and/or expectation 
2. Contribution to job creation 
3. Tax contribution  
4. Social security contribution 
5. Responding to government policies 
6. Contribution to local economic development 
Dimension V: Employees 
1. Identification of employees’ interest and/or expectation 
2. Employees appreciation 
3. Number of employees   
4. Encouraging female employees 
5. Encouraging disabled employees 
6. Labour union participation  
7. Social security coverage 
8. Employee recruitment and/or turnover 
9. Corporate policy on employee training 
10. Number of employees trained 
11. Amount spent on employees training 
12. Employee satisfaction, loyalty and welfare 
13. Work safety training 
14. Health and safety standards 
Dimension VI: Community Involvement 
1. Identification of community’s interest and/or expectation 
2. Philanthropy policy 
3. Collaboration with charity foundations 
4. Political donation  
5. Sponsor students 
6. Donation to disabled and people/countries in disaster 
7. Donation for poverty alleviation 
8. Community programmes (health, education and sports) 
9. The amount spent on charitable and social activities 
10. The nature of charitable and social activities financed 
Dimension VII: Environment Protection, Energy Saving and Pollution Control 
1. Environment protection policy 
2. Raw materials conservation and/or recycling 
3. Environment protection programme 
4. Awards for environment protection 
5. Support for public/private action designed to protect the environment 
6. The amount spent on environmental protection 
7. Energy-saving policy 
8. Information on water usage 
9. Information on green office policy 
10. The projects financed by the company that may lead to harming the environment 
11. Emission of pollutants 
12. Amount of waste produced 
13. Pollution control procedures 
Dimension VIII: Customers 
1. Identification of customers’ interest and/or expectation 
2. Customer relationship management 
3. Management of customer complaints 
4. Customer private information protection 
5. Customer satisfaction 
6. Picture of main types of products 
7. New product and/or new process 
8. Product quality assurance and safety 
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9. Distribution of marketing network 
Dimension IX: Investors 
1. Identification of shareholders’ interest and/or expectation 
2. Identification of debtholders’ interest and/or expectation 
3. Investor relationship management 
4. Financial risk management 
5. Growth opportunities 
6. Profitability forecasts 
7. Investment strategies 
8. Dividend policy 
9. Capital structure management 
10. Online reporting (disclosure) 
Dimension X: Partners 
1. Identification of partners’ interest and/or expectation 
2. Management of partners’ interest and/or expectation 
3. Suppliers management system 
4. Long-term cooperation strategies 
5. Responsible purchasing policy 
6. Participation in industry associations 
 
Table 1: Description of main variables 
 
Variable Definition 
CSPDI Corporate social performance disclosure index constructed for 
each sample firm based on the items listed in appendix 1. 
Tobin’s Q (Q) Market to book value of total assets at the end of the year.  
Return on assets (ROA) The ratio of total income before tax to total assets.  
Stock return   Annualized daily stock returns. 
Firm age (AGE) The natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
establishment of a company until 2011. 
Firm size (SIZE) The natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of a 
company as observed at the end of 2010. 
Cross-listing dummy (LIST) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is cross-listed in 
Hong Kong stock exchange and 0 otherwise. 
%State-owned (PercSOE) Proportion of state-owned shares to total shares as observed at 
the end of 2010. 
State-owned dummy (SOE) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is state-owned 
and 0 otherwise 
Leverage  The ratio of total liabilities to total equity as observed at the 
end of 2010. 
Dividends-pay-out  (DivPayout) The ratio of total dividends to net income as observed at the 
end of 2010. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the corporate social performance index  
 
Index Mean Median Max. Min. Std Skew Kurtosis 
Panel A: CSPDI by Dimension 
CSPDI 0.532 0.536 0.928 0.247 0.186 0.229 1.922 
D1 0.323 0.273 1.000 0.000 0.222 0.767 2.662 
D2 0.756 0.692 1.000 0.539 0.101 1.112 3.419 
D3 0.402 0.333 1.000 0.000 0.336 0.319 1.904 
D4 0.591 0.600 1.000 0.000 0.288 0.014 1.679 
D5 0.529 0.500 0.929 0.143 0.216 0.119 1.929 
D6 0.392 0.400 0.900 0.000 0.311 0.036 1.501 
D7 0.406 0.385 0.923 0.000 0.251 0.106 2.118 
D8 0.497 0.444 1.000 0.111 0.219 0.241 2.232 
D9 0.886 0.900 1.000 0.700 0.076 0.149 1.936 
D10 0.499 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.348 0.143 1.627 
Panel B: CSPDI by Industry 
Construction 0.711 0.691 0.876 0.567 0.121 0.291 1.585 
Real Estate 0.449 0.443 0.773 0.278 0.150 0.636 2.303 
I.T 0.514 0.557 0.722 0.309 0.166 -0.103 1.500 
Transportation 0.604 0.675 0.928 0.247 0.286 -0.211 1.339 
Utilities 0.558 0.583 0.732 0.351 0.143 -0.433 1.807 
Mining 0.586 0.629 0.907 0.329 0.202 0.031 1.549 
Manufacturing 0.520 0.526 0.856 0.268 0.175 0.203 1.951 
Panel C: CSPDI by Ownership 
SOE 0.55.6 0.56 0.93 0.00 0.20 2.429 2.733 
Non SOE 0.45.4 0.43 0.87 0.27 0.16 -0.164 0.701 
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Note: D1,…D10 are Ethics ,Corporate Governance, Corporate social Responsibility Management, 
Government, Employees, Community Involvement, Environment Protection, Energy Saving and 
Pollution Control, Customers, Investors and Partners dimensions of the CSPDI respectively as in 
Appendix 1. SOE and Non SOE are state-owned enterprises and non-state owned enterprises 
respectively. 
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         Table 3: CSPDI items with the lowest scores across the 10 dimensions and industries. 
 
Dim 
# 
Index item 
CSPDI 
 (%) 
Industry Sectors 
Ind 1 Ind 2 Ind 3 Ind 4 Ind 5 Ind 6 Ind 7 
1 Issue guideline for business ethics 8.72 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.38 0.25 0.09 0.03 
1 Issue guideline for employees’ behavior 10.07 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.38 0.13 0.09 0.10 
1 Promoting fair competition 16.13 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.38 0.36 0.16 
1 Equal opportunities policy 21.48 0.71 0.29 0.16 0.38 0.13 0.23 0.17 
2 Membership of committees 12.08 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.11 
2 Board composition: executive vs. non-executive  16.11 0.57 0.43 0.42 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.08 
3 Training on corporate social responsibility 12.08 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.50 0.13 0.14 0.10 
3 Management mechanism of corporate social responsibility  18.79 0.43 0.29 0.11 0.50 0.13 0.23 0.14 
5 Encouraging disabled employees 8.72 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.10 
5 Amount spent on employees training 10.07 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.23 0.06 
5 Employees appreciation 19.52 0.29 0.43 0.32 0.50 0.38 0.36 0.19 
6 The nature of charitable and social activities financed 7.01 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 Information on green office policy 15.12 0.43 0.29 0.11 0.38 0.38 0.05 0.13 
7 The amount spent on environment protection 19.49 0.43 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.25 0.41 0.27 
8 Customer private information protection 8.05 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.25 0.00 0.09 0.06 
8 Management of customer complaints 16.11 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.14 0.16 
Note: D1,…D10 are Ethics ,Corporate Governance, orporate Social Responsibility Management, Government, Employees, Community Involvement, 
Environment Protection, Energy Saving and Pollution Control, Customers, Investors and Partners dimensions of the CSPDI respectively as in Appendix 1. 
Ind1…Ind7 are Construction, Real Estate, Information Technology, Transportation, Utilities, Mining, Manufacturing 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis 
 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
CSPDI 0.532 0.536 0.927 0.247 0.186 0.228 1.921 
Q 1.645 1.280 6.335 0.342 0.947 2.292 9.788 
ROA 0.068 0.049 0.381 -0.056 0.062 1.797 7.966 
Stock return 0.356 0.303 1.704 -0.978 0.424 0.369 3.772 
AGE 2.59 2.708 3.332 1.098 0.464 -1.462 4.742 
SIZE 24.57 23.631 27.992 21.248 0.949 1.032 5.891 
LIST 0.161 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.369 1.844 4.400 
SOE 0.732 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.444 -1.045 2.092 
PercSOE 0.134 0.057 0.760 0.000 0.239 1.491 3.559 
Leverage 1.601 1.242 5.879 0.085 1.218 1.399 4.717 
DivPayout 0.267 0.208 0.937 0.000 0.246 0.839 2.857 
CSPDI: Corporate social performance disclosure index constructed for each sample firm based on the 
items listed in appendix 1; Q: Tobin’s Q calculated as market to book value of total assets at the end of 
the year; ROA: Return on assets calculated as the ratio of total income before tax to total assets; Stock 
return: Stock returns measured by the annualized daily stock returns; AGE: Company age measured by 
the natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of a company until 2011; SIZE: 
Company size measured by the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of a company as observed 
at the end of 2010; LIST: Cross listing dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is cross-listed and 0 
otherwise; SOE: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is state-owned and 0 otherwise; 
PercSOE: Proportion of state-owned shares to total shares as observed at the end of 2010; Leverage: 
Financial leverage calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total equity as observed at the end of 
2010; DivPayout: Dividends pay-out ratio calculated as the ratio of total dividends to net income as 
observed at the end of 2010. 
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     Table 5: Correlation matrix for the main variables used in the study 
 
 CSPDI Q ROA Stock return AGE SIZE LIST SOE PercSOE Leverage DivPayout 
CSPDI 1.00           
Q -0.36*** 1.00          
ROA -0.16* 0.42*** 1.00         
Stock return -0.23** 0.22*** 0.33*** 1.00        
AGE -0.33*** 0.09 0.10 0.42*** 1.00       
SIZE 0.52*** -0.04 0.07 -0.33*** -0.43*** 1.00      
LIST 0.52*** -0.24*** -0.07 -0.16* -0.24*** 0.54*** 1.00     
SOE 0.21** -0.16** -0.12 -0.17* -0.26*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 1.00    
PercSOE 0.08 -0.16* -0.18** -0.11 -0.33*** 0.06 -0.01 0.24*** 1.00   
Leverage 0.11 -0.24*** -0.42*** -0.17 -0.10 -0.08 0.15* 0.11 0.13 1.00  
DivPayout 0.13* 0.03 -0.02 -0.16* -0.23*** 0.10 -0.04 0.11 0.12 -0.11 1.00 
The Table presents the correlation matrix between the covariates used in the analysis. CSPDI: Corporate social performance disclosure index constructed for each 
sample firm based on the items listed in appendix 1; Q: Tobin’s Q calculated as market to book value of total assets at the end of the year; ROA: Return on assets 
calculated as the ratio of total income before tax to total assets; Stock return: Stock returns measured by the annualized daily stock returns; AGE: Company age 
measured by the natural logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of a company until 2011; SIZE: Company size measured by the natural logarithm of 
the market capitalisation of a company as observed at the end of 2010; LIST: Cross listing dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is cross-listed and 0 otherwise; 
SOE: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is state-owned and 0 otherwise; PercSOE: Proportion of state-owned shares to total shares as observed at the end of 
2010; Leverage: Financial leverage calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total equity as observed at the end of 2010; DivPayout: Dividends pay-out ratio calculated 
as the ratio of total dividends to net income as observed at the end of 2010. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 6: OLS estimation results for CSP and FP equations 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Panel A: CSP Equation Panel B: FP Equation 
Model 1 
CSPDI 
Model 2 
CSPDI 
Model 3 
CSPDI 
Model 4 
Q 
Model 5 
ROA 
Model 6 
StRit 
CSPDI    -2.521*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.051* 
(-1.84) 
-0.293* 
(-1.65) 
Q -0.053*** 
(-5.53) 
     
ROA  -0.571** 
(-1.98) 
    
Stock return   -0.051* 
(-1.64) 
   
AGE -0.055* 
(-1.65) 
-0.054 
(-1.59) 
-0.044 
(-01.18) 
-0.029 
(-0.18) 
0.011 
(1.43) 
0.216*** 
(3.41) 
SIZE 0.063*** 
(4.78) 
0.061*** 
(4.12) 
0.054*** 
(3.46) 
0.266* 
(1.82) 
0.010* 
(1.73) 
0.045 
(1.13) 
LIST 0.114*** 
(2.80) 
0.139*** 
(3.57) 
0.145*** 
(3.52)  
-0.221 
(-1.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.022 
(-0.25) 
SOE -0.027 
(-0.95) 
-0.014 
(-0.45) 
-0.015 
(-0.48) 
-0.359* 
(-1.78) 
-0.008 
(-0.83) 
-0.109 
(-1.48) 
Leverage 0.001 
(0.06) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.008 
(0.93) 
-0.135** 
(-2.49) 
-0.014*** 
(-4.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.08) 
Constant -0.741** 
(-2.07) 
-0.755* 
(-1.93) 
-0.642 
(-1.56) 
-2.494 
(-0.75) 
-0.146 
(-1.05) 
1.122 
(1.15) 
# observations 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Industry 
dummies 
No No No No No No 
R-squared 0.451 0384 0.371 0.238 0.228 0.201 
F-statistic 30.49 
(P=0.00) 
24.03 
(P=0.00) 
21.23 
(P=0.00) 
7.42 
(P=0.00) 
4.90 
(P=0.00) 
7.74 
(P=0.00) 
The Table presents the estimation of equations 1 and 2 separately. CSPDI: Corporate social 
performance disclosure index constructed for each sample firm based on the items listed in appendix 
1; Q: Tobin’s Q calculated as market to book value of total assets at the end of the year; ROA: Return 
on assets calculated as the ratio of total income before tax to total assets; Stock return: Stock returns 
measured by the annualized daily stock returns; AGE: Company age measured by the natural 
logarithm of the number of years since the establishment of a company until 2011; SIZE: Company 
size measured by the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of a company as observed at the 
end of 2010; LIST: Cross listing dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is cross-listed and 0 
otherwise; SOE: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is state-owned and 0 otherwise; 
Leverage: Financial leverage calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total equity as observed at 
the end of 2010. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at 
the 1% level. t-statistic of each coefficient is reported in the parentheses. The 
Huber/White/Sandwich estimator is used to obtain robust standard errors. 
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Table 7: 3SLS estimation results for CSPDI and FP equations 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
CSP Equation FP Equation 
System 1 
CSPDI 
System 2 
CSPDI 
System 3 
CSPDI 
System 1 
        Q 
System 2 
ROA 
System 3 
StRit 
CSPDI 
 
 
 
-0.807 
(-0.43) 
-0.019 
(-0.12) 
-0.915 
(-1.16) 
Q -0.073
***
 
(-4.64) 
 
   
 
ROA 
 
-0.432 
(-1.57) 
   
 
Stock return 
  
-0.059
**
 
(-2.36) 
  
 
AGE -0.053
*
 
(-1.70) 
-0.055
*
 
(-1.71) 
-0.057
*
 
(-1.71) 
 
  
SIZE 0.059
***
 
(3.92) 
0.059
***
 
(3.76) 
0.052
***
 
(3.31) 
-0.046 
(-0.30) 
-0.006 
(-0.50) 
0.205 
(0.121) 
LIST 0.114
***
 
(2.80) 
0.141
***
 
(3.36) 
0.149
***
 
(3.52) 
0.119 
(0.46) 
-0.006 
(-0.24) 
0.601* 
(1.85) 
SOE -0.030 
(-1.03) 
-0.009 
(-0.29) 
-0.013 
(-0.43) 
-0.080 
(-0.76) 
0.009 
(1.07) 
-0.121 
(-0.89) 
Leverage -0.002 
(-0.20) 
0.003 
(0.33) 
0.011 
(1.11) 
-0.048 
(-1.52) 
0.002 
(0.61) 
0.034 
(0.72) 
Q-1  
 
 
0.509
***
 
(6.26) 
  
ROA-1     
1.043
***
 
(9.37) 
 
Stock return-1  
   
 0.402*** 
(3.07) 
Constant -0.615 
(-1.56) 
-0.718
*
 
(-1.77) 
-0.618 
(-1.50) 
2.233 
(0.88) 
0.143 
(0.71) 
-2.355 
(-0.80) 
# observations 141 141  141 141  
Industry dummies No No No No No No 
R-squared 0.422 0.383 0.354 0.741 0.616 0.747 
Chi
2
-statistic 110.57 
(p = .000) 
85.96 
(p =.000) 
86.27
 
(p =.000) 
410.68 
(p = .000) 
125.03 
(p = .000) 
151.29 
(p = .000) 
The Table presents the estimation 3SLS as in system of equations 4. CSPDI: Corporate social performance 
disclosure index constructed for each sample firm based on the items listed in appendix 1; Q: Tobin’s Q 
calculated as market to book value of total assets at the end of the year; ROA: Return on assets calculated 
as the ratio of total income before tax to total assets; Stock return: Stock returns measured by the 
annualized daily stock returns; AGE: Company age measured by the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since the establishment of a company until 2011; SIZE: Company size measured by the natural 
logarithm of the market capitalisation of a company as observed at the end of 2010; LIST: Cross listing 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is cross-listed and 0 otherwise; SOE: A dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the company is state-owned and 0 otherwise; Leverage: Financial leverage calculated as the ratio of 
total liabilities to total equity as observed at the end of 2010; Q-: 1: Lagged Q ratio (2010); ROA-1:Lagged 
return on assets (2010); Stock return -1: Lagged stock returns (2010).* Significant at the 10% level; ** 
significant at the 5% level; and *** significant at the 1% level. z-statistic of each coefficient is reported in 
the parentheses.  
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        Table 8: Robustness Tests 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable CSPDI CSPDI CSPDI CSPDI 
Q -0.056*** 
(-5.28) 
-0.0421*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.041*** 
(-4.55) 
-0.041*** 
(-4.41) 
AGE -0.046 
(-1.22) 
-0.045 
(-1.23) 
-0.038 
(-1.01) 
-0.022 
(-0.54) 
SIZE 0.063*** 
(4.52) 
0.064*** 
(4.48) 
0.064*** 
(4.41) 
0.065*** 
(4.12) 
LIST 0.115** 
(2.56) 
0.114*** 
(2.65) 
0.116*** 
(2.72) 
0.115*** 
(2.65) 
SOE -0.027 
(-0.85) 
-0.028 
(-0.87) 
-0.030 
(-0.95) 
 
PercSOE    0.047 
(0.75) 
Leverage 0.002 
(0.81) 
0.005 
(0.45) 
0.006 
(0.59) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
DivPayout   0.058 
(1.13) 
0.054 
(1.02) 
Constant -.717* 
(-1.92) 
-0.809** 
(-2.11) 
-0.837** 
(-2.16) 
-0.927** 
(-2.23) 
# observations 141 141 141 141 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.459 0.463 0.468 0.456 
F-statistic 13.49 
(P=0.000) 
12.44 
(P=0.000) 
11.53 
(P=0.000) 
11.41 
(P=0.000) 
CSPDI: Corporate social performance disclosure index constructed for each sample firm 
based on the items listed in appendix 1; Q: Tobin’s Q calculated as market to book value 
of total assets at the end of 2010; AGE: Company age measured by the natural logarithm 
of the number of years since the establishment of a company until 2011; SIZE: Company 
size measured by the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation of a company as 
observed at the end of 2010; LIST: Cross listing dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
company is cross-listed and 0 otherwise; PercSOE: Proportion of state-owned shares to 
total shares as observed at the end of 2010; FL: Financial leverage calculated as the ratio 
of total liabilities to total equity as observed at the end of 2010; DivPayout: Dividends 
pay-out ratio calculated as the ratio of total dividends to net income as observed at the 
end of 2010. * Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; and *** 
significant at the 1% level. t-statistic of each coefficient is reported in the parentheses. 
The Huber/White/Sandwich estimator is used to obtain robust standard errors.  
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Figure 1: Corporate social performance index by dimension 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Corporate social performance index by industry 
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Highlights 
 
MS. Ref.  FINANA-D-14-00072R1 ‘The Social, Environmental and Ethical 
Performance of Chinese Companies: Evidence from the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 Examine social performance (CSP) and financial performance (FP) of Chinese firms 
 Design a social, environment and ethics disclosure index (CSPDI) 
 CSPDI investors dimension has highest score; ethics dimension the lowest score 
 Find that the better the FP, the worse the CSP disclosure 
 Use 3SLS for bi-directional relationship of CSP and FP; CSP is determined by FP 
